The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GEORGIA TO GEORGIA: A CASE FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES R. WEBB United States Army National Guard

<u>DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:</u>
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

19970625 119



USAWC CLASS OF 1997

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

GEORGIA TO GEORGIA: A CASE FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

by

Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Webb United States Army National Guard

Colonel (Ret) Phillip W. Mock Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Charles R. Webb (LTC), ARNG

TITLE: Georgia to Georgia: A Case for the

National Guard State Partnership Program

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 7 April 1997 PAGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The United States of America is guided by a National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement. Like never before, it embraces a historic but fleeting opportunity to assist in the expansion of democracy abroad. The former Soviet Republic of Georgia in the Transcaucasus is a newly independent nation that is asking for U.S. help. This includes requests for military assistance. To assist Georgia in conventional ways could further extend and stress U.S. military resources. could also create diplomatic problems with Russia. Such a situation requires skillful strategic art. This paper investigates the issues involved and examines the National Guard State Partnership Program as an effective element that the U.S. military can use to assist Georgia in building a democracy. addition to an extensive literature review, the research findings are the results of interviews conducted in Tbilisi by the author.

To the people of Georgia and their hope for democracy

and

To Colonels Brace, Cunningham and Mock, visionary leaders who make things happen

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research effort is the result of the inspiration, help and support of many people. Sincere appreciation is extended to the faculty and staff of the U.S. Army War College. Maj. Gen. Richard A. Chilcoat, the Commandant, has insured an excellent environment for academic research, reflective thinking and learning. Special thanks to Ambassador Ted Russell for his help, and to Dr. Craig Nation for sharing his insight of Transcaucasia. Thanks also to Pat Pond, E. J. Nichols, Bettye Sanders, Sandi Sellers, Dot Overcash and many others at the AWC who helped.

In Tbilisi, Lt. Col. Jim Howcroft (USMC) cares for the people of Georgia, and his dedication and competence are credits to the U.S. military. I am grateful for my new Georgian friends, like Maia Namoradze and Vanoga Kadagidze. I am appreciative of the honesty and insight that my interview subjects provided.

Brig. Gen. Tom McCullough first suggested this topic. The personal interest by him and Maj. Gen. William P. Bland, The Adjutant General for the State of Georgia, is appreciated.

I have saved my most heartfelt thanks for last. Without the help of Colonels Bob Brace, Paul Cunningham and Phil Mock, this project just simply would not have made it. If there is any good that comes from this research, it is they who deserve the credit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACTii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSvi
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
BACKGROUND
Democratization
Transcaucasus
RESEARCH
Research Method15
Research Questions 15 Interview Results 16
CONCLUSIONS25
Findings
Summary
ENDNOTES31
RIBITOGRAPHY

Introduction

America faces new choices in determining its strategy for national security. The Cold War doctrine of containment has been replaced by a new strategy of engagement and enlargement. Its intent is to protect the nation's security, prosperity, and fundamental values.¹

America's new choices include various roles in promoting democracy abroad. Democratization can improve national security and reduce threats of future war.

National strategies like democratization are implemented by instruments of national power. These are diplomatic, economic, informational, and military in nature. They are most effective when applied in coordination with each other.²

Like the other instruments of power, efforts of the military must neither be isolated nor uncoordinated. Furthermore, the military must consider all of its available resources, including the reserve forces.

The United States (U.S.) currently embraces a generally stable security environment that is capable of being improved through proactive ways such as democratization. However, democratization itself can be difficult, particularly when it involves a geographical region that is within another nation's sphere of influence.

Statement of the Problem

Within Russia's sphere of influence is the former Soviet
Republic of Georgia, located in the Transcaucasus region.
Georgia could benefit from U.S. assistance, and its success in
democratization would create a friendly nation in the
Transcaucasus, similar to Israel in the Middle East. However,
Georgia's progress is hindered by numerous variables of extreme
complexity. These include civil war, rising crime, ethnic
unrest, migration of refugees, a struggling economy, civilmilitary difficulties, intervention by the Russian military, and
inexperience with a democratic government. All of these factors
complicate U.S. assistance to Georgia.

Although the people of Georgia are in need of help, Moscow seems to view such assistance from the West as a threat. How the U.S. can assist Georgia and not endanger its relationship with Russia is a precarious strategic challenge.

This paper examines these issues and assesses the potential for U.S. military assistance to Georgia. Specifically, the value of deploying U.S. National Guard (NG) units through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is reviewed. The hypothesis of this study is that the National Guard State Partnership Program

(NGSPP) is an effective element that can be used by the U.S. military to assist the former Soviet Republic of Georgia in building a democracy. If this is true, it would demonstrate the unique advantages and potential of the NGSPP as a low-threat, initial-entry element of the military in assisting other nations that have problems similar to those in Georgia.

Significance of the Study

The transition from the Cold War offers opportunities to shape and control the changes that could provide for lasting peace. Applying strategic art, the U.S. can choose the most logical concepts (ways) and formulate the most effective resources (means) to promote its current strategy (ends). In doing so, democracy will be expanded and developed throughout the world. In the next century, this could provide the blessings of liberty for more of the world's population than ever before. Notwithstanding a strong and capable warfighting deterrence, democratizaton may become the best policy the U.S. has in preventing war. In certain cases, the NGSPP could be the most logical and effective spearhead for this purpose.

Background

Democratization

The Cold War lasted more than 40 years. In looking back, the realist theory that was originally developed by classic philosophers is what actually maintained the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviets.

In his <u>Art of War</u>, Niccolo Machiavelli described the intimate relationship that should exist between military and civic affairs, advocating an armed citizenry and a strong militia.⁴ In the <u>Prince</u>, he wrote that whatever moral conduct fits the condition is the one that should be used.⁵ This is explained in his discourses about foreign policy⁶ and diplomatic advisors.⁷

Three centuries later, Carl von Clausewitz advanced this idea of war as an extension of politics. He asserted that the political objective should be the original motive of war, and it should thus be the standard for determining both the aim of the military and the amount of effort to be applied. However, On War by Clausewitz has left today's strategists to not only devise their own ways of defining victory, but to also balance the three delicate parts of his remarkable trinity, which consists of the people, the military, and the government.

Sun Tzu proposed using military power in an attempt to first gain political ends without ever fighting. In Samuel Griffith's preface to The Art of War, he describes Sun Tzu's belief that "the skillful strategist should be able to subdue the enemy's army without engaging it." If the ultimate objectives of military operations are indeed political, then the teachings of Sun Tzu should be guides for finding creative ways and means to achieve a peaceful endstate. A nation is fortunate when its strategic leaders foresee political changes and then look for innovative ways to design astute military operations. 11

In this century, there have been two world wars. Following the end of World War I (1918), revengeful nations of the world demanded reparation from Germany, and the U.S. chose isolationism as its national strategy. These strategic decisions created an environment conducive for another armed conflict. After World War II (1945), the U.S. promoted a universal postwar program of engagement, and it joined the United Nations. Reconstruction in Europe under the Marshall Plan was a dramatic effort to prevent future world conflict.

The Marshall Plan was built on three premises: (1) what happens in Europe affects America, (2) economic reconstruction of Europe was critical to preventing another war, and (3) this

economic reconstruction would not happen without U.S. leadership.

The world today prospers from the vision of strategic leaders who fifty years ago conceived and enacted the Marshall Plan. 12

Today the U.S. has another historic opportunity to promote peace and prevent future conflict. At Harvard University in May 1996, William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, proposed a strategic plan for U.S. security during the post-Cold War period. It called for preventive defense as the first line of defense, deterrence the second line of defense, and military conflict as the third and last resort. He compared preventive defense to preventive medicine. It creates the conditions that support peace, thus making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary. 13

He saw a likeness in his preventive defense and the Marshall Plan, both creating conditions of peace and stability, and both dependent upon U.S. leadership:

There is no other country in the world with the ability to reach out to so many corners of the globe. There is no other country in the world whose efforts to do so are so respected.¹⁴

Like the Marshall Plan, preventive defense rests on a set of premises. They are: (1) fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes America and the world safer, (2) more democracy

in more nations means less chance of conflict in the world, and

(3) defense establishments have an important role to play in

building democracy, trust, and understanding in and among

nations. 15

Democracy embraces a universal set of values, and the goal of U.S. policy should be to pursue a strategy that creates the best possible framework for the spread of those values. ¹⁶ U.S. citizens not only believe in the ideals of democracy, but are also convinced that these ideals have worked in America and that they will contribute to a better life abroad and better world. ¹⁷

In the National Security Strategy (NSS), the U.S. military is uniquely perceived as an important instrument (means) to support democratization in other countries. It states:

. . . Our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force. 18

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is prefaced with similar support for peacetime engagement. It proposes:

The challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon. 19

However, peacetime engagement throughout the world has placed a large manpower burden on the U.S. military. It has generated more demand for Reserve Component (RC) support, including the NG. The end of the Cold War has necessitated that the U.S. take a new look at how the military is structured and the potential ways that the RC can be utilized.²⁰

Generally, U.S. citizens support peacetime engagement, including the programs initiated by NATO.²¹ It is the most likely regional organization for managing military presence.²² Such NATO initiatives include its PfP program. The PfP involves: (1) peacekeeping operations, (2) humanitarian assistance, and (3) search and rescue operations.²³

One of the newest aspects of PfP is the National Guard State Partnership Program which began in 1992. It provides authority for the U.S. National Guard Bureau (NGB) to link the NG of a U.S. State with a newly independent nation. For example, the former Soviet Republic of Georgia has a partnership with the U.S. State of Georgia. The unique nature of the citizen-soldier concept allows Guard members to serve as role-models, in both word and deed, for the promotion of democratic ideals and deference to civilian authority.

A recent study that examined the role of the NGSPP in promoting democracy was completed in 1995. He surveyed NGSPP coordinators in thirteen U.S. states. Although its format was designed primarily to solicit the creative efforts of each state, it did measure and define initiatives that were taking place in partnered nations. The findings indicated that almost all of the newly independent nations were functioning with a parliamentary form of democracy, and that these governments were indeed making progress in democratic reforms. The study also cited two areas where the NGSPP could develop even further. They were: (1) more state government involvement, including university systems and extension programs, and (2) more private sector involvement, especially in developing industry and business.

Transcaucasus

The Caucasus region is located in Southwestern Asia. It is between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, north of Turkey and Iran, and south of Russia. The Caucasus (or north Caucasus) comprises the Russian Federation republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardinia-Balkaria. The Transcaucasus comprises the states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

This region provides a barrier between Russia and countries to the south, including Turkey and Iran. Russians have not forgotten Turkish and Persian territorial ambitions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as the Turkish-Russian (and Turkish-Soviet) tensions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Turkey is viewed by Russia today as both a rival in the region and a surrogate for NATO.²⁶

The Caspian Sea provides newly discovered oil and gas reserves of a large magnitude. If properly developed, these reserves could provide future world markets with as much as two million barrels of oil a day. Construction of a gas and oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea across Georgia within the next decade is very likely. Interest in this new gas and oil resource has recently caused Great Britain, the U.S. and other Western powers to enter the Caspian political circle. Some observers believe that the U.S. should take a more active role in this development. Russia, of course, opposes such involvement by the West. Moscow links the development of Caspian oil and gas reserves with its regional security, seeing it as an East-West issue.

Russians generally believe that the Transcaucasus is economically and politically inseparable from Russia. They feel

that neither Georgia, Armenia nor Azerbaijan can make it on its own. This belief is founded on Russia's presence in this area for the past two hundred years. The Transcaucasus is seen no differently than that of the North Caucasus which has remained within the Russian Federation.³⁰

Russia is interested in exclusive systems of trade and economic cooperation with this border region. However, all three Transcaucasus republics are more interested in political and economic cooperation with the West, though in different forms and intensity.³¹

The issues at stake in this region transcend energy and local security issues, however. They include fundamental issues of European security, as well as the problems of democratic reform in Russia itself.³²

Georgia

Georgia is one of the newly independent nations located in the Transcaucasus region. Its total land area is about 69,700 square kilometers, which is slightly larger than the U.S. State of South Carolina. The population is about 5,700,000 people.³³

Georgia has undergone more turmoil, strife and bloodshed than most of the other newly independent states. Since 1990,

widespread conflicts have severely aggravated the economy.

Crisis resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet command economy in December 1991. Throughout 1993 and 1994, industry in Georgia was functioning at only about 20 percent capacity. Heavy disruptions in agricultural cultivation have also occurred, and tourism is now almost non-existent. For the past three years, the country was precariously dependent on U.S. and European Union (EU) humanitarian grain shipments. However, these were stopped in June 1996.³⁴

Georgia has also been beset by ethnic and civil strife since its independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991. It has faced armed separatist conflicts in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. A cease-fire went into effect in South Ossetia in June 1992 and a joint Georgian-Ossetian-Russian peacekeeping force has been in place since that time. Nearly 200,000 Georgian refugees have fled Abkhazia, adding substantially to the estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons already in Georgia. Russian peacekeepers are deployed along the border of Abkhazia and other parts of Georgia. Georgia has also been plagued with competing Mafias struggling for economic control of the country.³⁵

Three wars, continuing civil strife, and economic chaos have forced Georgia to acquiesce to Russia's demands for a Russian military presence in Georgia in addition to Georgian membership in the Russian-sponsored Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These conditions have created even further discord because many Georgians oppose Russian influence in Georgia, regardless of the price Georgia must pay.³⁶

There does not appear to be easy, peaceful solutions to Georgia's immediate problems. Without U.S. and Western assistance, Georgia's chance of developing its democratic form of government is doubtful. Diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power are having limited effects. The military has only just begun to be utilized.

NGSPP in Georgia

The NGSPP is still in the introductory phase in Georgia.

Initial contact was made in May 1995. Since that time, the partnership has strengthened with exchange visits.³⁷

NGSPP efforts significantly increased in January 1997, however, when the initial planning conference (IPC) for Cornerstone 97 was held in Tbilisi. This new NGSPP mission has tasked an engineer element (878th Engineer Battalion, GaARNG) to

deploy in three phases to Tbilisi during the summer of 1997 to repair the Tbilisi Children's Hospital, Skeneti Orphanage, and the Tbilisi Orphanage. These three buildings were damaged four years ago in the Georgian civil war. Three 21-day rotations, each consisting of fifty to sixty engineers, are to be conducted. The work is to include plumbing, carpentry, masonry, and electrical improvements to the existing structures. The NG engineer element is to conduct this PfP mission as its annual training (AT) instead of attending AT during the summer at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Preparations for the mission are underway, and the expectations are high. In twenty years, though, Georgians in the Transcaucasus will probably not recall whether or not Cornerstone 97 was successful, but they will know if they are free and democratic. Strategic leaders will also know if the world became a safer place because of preventive defense, democratization and the NGSPP.

Research

Research Method

The interview was the method used to acquire the data for this research. Eight (8) different subjects were interviewed in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, during the period 25-27 February 1997. They were selected because of their knowledge and understanding of the geopolitical situation in Georgia.

The subjects included key U.S. Embassy personnel as well as Georgian political and military leaders, some at the highest legislative and military levels. All interviews were audio taped, and the use of a linguistic translater was necessary during two of the interviews.

Research Questions

All eight of the subjects were asked three primary questions. They were:

- (1) Do most Georgians want a democracy?
- (2) Does U.S. support cause problems with Russia?
- (3) Is the NGSPP an effective element that the U.S. military can use to assist Georgia in building a democracy?

Some additional questions were also asked. The answers provided additional background information, as well as a clearer understanding of the geopolitical situation in Georgia.

Interview Results

Courtney Interview

William H. Courtney is the Ambassador of the United States of America to Georgia. He discussed how all four elements of national power were affecting Georgia. Without hesitation, he responded that most Georgians want a democracy. He acknowledged that U.S. support probably does cause problems with Russia. stated that the NGSPP is very effective, especially as an entrylevel form of military assistance. The Ambassador added that civilian oversight of the military in a democracy is something new for Georgians and the citizen-soldier concept is difficult for Georgians to understand. He noted that Georgians are accustomed to a large standing army, and they do not yet recognize the talents and flexibility that citizen-soldiers bring to the military. He also previewed future plans that would follow if Cornerstone 97 is successful. The Ambassador added that NATO expansion would soon be an issue for Georgia, and the success which occurs now can have an impact on that issue.39

Kerr Interview

Lawrence (Larry) M. Kerr, Deputy Chief of Missions at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, described the Embassy teamwork that is required to achieve U.S. goals and objectives. He said that most Georgians want a democratic form of government. Shaping a new generation of leaders and providing them with opportunities to talk about and experience democracy with Americans are priorities, according to Kerr. Although some believe that the economy must first be successful if democracy is to survive in Georgia, Kerr strongly believes that the opposite is true. reasons that if democracy works, it will put in place the systems that will cause the economy to be successful. He said that U.S. sponsorship of these systems likely creates concern for Russia. He stated that the NGSPP has unique advantages as the first step in military assistance to Georgia. He also discussed the upcoming Cornerstone 97 exercise, and he related how difficult it was at first for the Georgian military to grasp why soldiers would be working on a children's hospital and orphanages. He added that a fixed U.S. military base in the country might create problems with some Georgians and certainly with Russia. 40

Howcroft Interview

James (Jim) R. Howcroft, Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Marine Corps, is the Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi. A 1995 graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, he provided great insight about the strategic role of the U.S. military in Georgia. He said that it is obvious to him that almost all Georgians want a democracy. According to Lieutenant Colonel Howcroft, the U.S. military is just beginning to provide humanitarian, civil and security assistance. He stated that the NGSPP is proving to be very effective as one of the initial elements that he has employed to start this assistance. He pointed out similarities between the NGSPP and the U.S. Coast Guard training project that he is planning to follow Cornerstone 97. Like the NGSPP, it is also expected to be of less concern to Russia, as compared to Georgians training with U.S. Navy warships in the Black Sea. Lieutenant Colonel Howcroft elaborated on the future importance of a coast guard when the pipeline's gas and oil start being exported from Georgian ports along the Black Sea. His anticipation of such needs that are ten years in the future indicates the degree of creative strategic thinking that is already underway. He also noted that the U.S. military will save money with Cornerstone 97 because participating Guard members

will be paid from funds already budgeted for their required AT.

Lieutenant Colonel Howcroft said that the Russians would not be happy to see American soldiers in Georgia, and it would be viewed by them as a threat. However, he added that the NG will pose a lesser threat at this time than active components.⁴¹

Chumburidze Interview

Jemal Chumburidze, a Major General in the Georgian Army, is the Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Georgian National Guard. During the interview at his headquarters, he said that Georgians were determined to build a democracy. The Georgian NG troops (about 2,500) now make up the army's First Brigade. According to Major General Chumburidze, Russians do not like Georgian relations with U.S. and the West, and they attempt to prevent such relationships by instigating uprisings like those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Major General Chumburidze said that the NGSPP is effective and very important to his country's NG. He stated that he sees no difference in the capabilities of the U.S. active component and the NG soldiers being sent to assist Georgia. However, he said that he believes Moscow is threatened less by the NG. He himself would welcome U.S. military bases in Georgia, but he said that he thought it would cause problems within the Georgian government at this time. 42

Maisaia Interview

Vakhtang Maisaia is an Advanced Specialist for the Parliament Staff of Georgia. He is also a doctoral fellow at the University of Tbilisi and a free-lance journalist for various newspapers and publications in Georgia. His comments about the current peacekeeping intervention by Russia provided a sobering realization that the Russians still have the potential to make Georgians suffer for any agreements they make with the West. According to his estimates, there are about 22,000 Russian troops and about two hundred tanks currently in Georgia. On a map, he pointed to the six locations of Russian bases, which include Tbilisi, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in addition to one near the Turkish border and two near the Armenian border. He said that the military base in Tbilisi was occupied by a central military staff with security and support elements as well as a chemical unit. He took this author to that base in Tbilisi. The area was fenced and guarded. From the outside, it was estimated that a force of about 250-500 troops were located within the compound. Mr. Maisaia said that Georgia needs U.S. military assistance and that the U.S. NG is a good choice with which to begin. He said that most Georgians want a democracy, and that Russia was definitely threatened by U.S. assistance to Georgia. 43

Kuchuradze Interview

Badri Kuchuradze is the senior political analyst for the Parliament. He is the Head of Service for Public Opinion and International Affairs. In his office in the Parliament, he stated that Georgia's historical enemies have been Turkey and Iran, and that past association with Russia was for protection from Muslim aggression from the south going back for centuries. Some Georgians still fear this, and they want Georgia to remain closely aligned with Russia. However, he explained that a majority of Georgians want to be free of Russia, although many areas are still split on this subject. Using a world map, he illustrated how Georgia is the crossroads in the Transcaucasus, and he explained why its strategic geographical position is a primary interest for Russia. He said that Russia would prefer an oil and gas pipeline through Chechnya in the north, but with the armed conflict going on there, Georgia now becomes the most likely route through which the major pipeline will be built. does not believe that Russia would stand for a U.S. military base in Georgia. He also stated that military activities such as the NGSPP are more feasible at this time, rather than U.S. bases or active forces. He noted that the present situation in Georgia is similar to that of the 1920's when no major power would assist

Georgia, and Russia occupied the country. He said that a major power now needs to step forward in some way and help Georgia, or it will be lost to Russia again. He predicts that current world opinion could be the cause of Georgia losing its freedom again because most observers view the Transcaucasus as a legitimate part of Russia's sphere of influence.⁴⁴

Gulahvili Interview

Malkaz Gulahvili is the owner and publisher of The Georgian Times, considered one of the two most popular newspapers in Tbilisi. He explained that all seven of the major newspapers in Georgia are independently owned and controlled. The Times recently privatized as a corporation, and it is financially supported by business advertisements. It is considered to have a moderately conservative view of events. Its circulation is about 10,000, making it the second largest in Tbilisi. Prior to 1994, Gulahvili was head of the State Bureau of Georgia and thus coordinated CIS activities. He stated that the protection of human rights is the main purpose of his newspaper. Gulahvili said that the NGSPP is an intelligent way to bring the U.S. military to Georgia. He announced that a special edition is being planned for the upcoming Cornerstone 97 mission in hopes of informing the Georgian public about the kind of humanitarian

assistance that can be provided by the military. He said that most Georgians want to be democratic and that Moscow feels threatened by U.S. assistance. 45

Adamia Interview

Revaz Adamia has been a member of the Georgian Parliament since 1992. He is the Chairman of Parliament's Defense and Security Committee and a member of Georgia's National Security Council. He is considered to be one of the five most influential leaders in Georgia and a possible successor to President Shevardnadze. He stated that the NGSPP can be effective in his country for three reasons: (1) the Russians are not alarmed with it because they see it as a state-to-state agreement, (2) it involves only ground forces which will be openly visible to the Russians, and (3) the leadership of his country's NG is not as oriented to Russia as the rest of the military, thus providing the best entry point for Western influence. He emphasized that the NGSPP is less agitating to Moscow than the use of U.S. active duty forces. According to Mr. Adamia, Cornerstone 97 is extremely important geopolitically because it is the first real Georgian-American military exercise. He appeared very anxious for follow-on programs to occur not only with the NG, but with active forces as well. He indicated that he would eventually

like to have U.S. military advisors in his country. He said that most Georgians want a democracy and that their persistence through difficult economic times should prove this to the West. He also said that U.S. assistance was a problem for Russia, but that much of the problem was within Russia itself. His concluding remarks about Russia were especially interesting. They also provided an affirmation to the wisdom of U.S. policy. In concluding the interview, his message to Russia was:

independent country . . . then I will be your friend. But if you continue as you have being doing all of this time in the post-Soviet era . . like creating instability . . . then in 10 or 15 years, there will be no Russians here . . . they will go out on their own. Look, there is a generation of small children in Georgia who do not speak Russian. This is a problem which Russians create . . . because they create the attitude of an unfriendly country. I will try to teach my children not Russian, but English or German . . . because I can see these countries considering Georgia as a state. That is the most important thing. Unfortunately, few Russians understand. 46

Conclusions

Findings

The interviews proved to be an excellent means for acquiring information about this topic from qualified primary sources. The interview process as a method of research has many strengths.⁴⁷

The interviews were: (1) simple to construct, (2) insured that questions were understood, (3) allowed further probe for details, (4) provided in-depth explanations, and (5) allowed the pursuit of other areas of interest. The consolidated interview results which follow show abbreviated responses to the primary questions:

Primary Questions

Question #1 - Do most Georgians want a democracy?

Question #2 - Does U.S. support cause problems with Russia?

Question #3 - Is the NGSPP an effective element that the

U.S. military can use to assist Georgia in

building a democracy?

Consolidated Interview Results

Interview Subjects Question #1 Question #2 Question #3

AMB Courtney	Yes	"Probably"	Yes
Mr. Kerr	Yes	"Likely"	Yes
LTC Howcroft	Yes	Yes	Yes
MG Chumburidze	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mr. Maisaia	Yes	"Definitely"	Yes
Mr. Kuchuradze	"Split"	Yes	Yes
Mr. Gulahvili	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mr. Adamia	Yes	Yes	Yes

Total Affirmative:

7

8

8

An analysis of the interviews and the background material produced three findings. An explanation of each one follows.

First, it is reasonable to acknowledge that most Georgians do want a democracy. Although one interview subject was inconclusive, all of the others strongly supported this finding. Further confirming this are events over the past few years. For example, a constitution for Georgia was ratified on 9 April 1991 by delegates who were representing various regions and political parties in Georgia. It established a democratic form of government that has been functioning with legislative, executive and judicial branches. Also, there have been free and open elections since that time.

Second, it is apparent to all eight subjects that U.S. assistance to Georgia does cause problems between Georgia and Russia. Most of those interviewed specifically indicated that direct and conventional U.S. military assistance would create concern in Moscow because of Russia's aim to maintain control of the whole Caucasus region. The lingering suspicions from the Cold War and the present instability in Russia are contributing factors. Considering these reasons, it understandable why each of the subjects recommended that a gradual, non-threatening U.S. approach would be best at this time.

Third, the data supports the NGSPP as an effective element that the U.S. military can use to assist Georgia in building a democracy. This appears to be especially true when the NGSPP is used as a friendly, initial-entry element by the military. For various reasons, all eight subjects predicted that the NG would be perceived by Moscow to be less-threatening than active components. According to some of the subjects, the U.S. NG could also provide Georgians with an example of citizen-soldiers, thus emphasizing civilian control of the military, an unfamiliar concept in former Soviet republics like Georgia. Furthermore, some of the subjects noted that NG soldiers have knowledge, skills and civilian experience in specific areas needed in Georgia. These include business, economy, health care management, education, construction, technology, and even local government management.

Recommendations

The appropriate level of U.S. military assistance to Georgia is difficult to determine. Just how far Russia would allow the U.S. to employ its military in this region and to what extent the American public is willing to become involved in supporting Georgia are two main concerns.

There appear to be three options. The first option would be to grant Georgia's requests for military training, equipment and advisors, but stopping short of basing U.S. troops in Georgia. If this occurs, a reprisal of some sort would be expected from Moscow. It could result in clandestine, ethnic uprisings (near the Armenian borders, in Abkhazia, or within South Ossetia) or even formal diplomatic protests. The second option for military support would be to provide assistance through less-threatening means. An example is Cornerstone 97 with NG engineers reconstructing hospitals and orphanages. Another example is U.S. Coast Guard assistance in developing a Georgian shore patrol in the Black Sea. These kinds of military activities would most likely trigger lesser reprisals, if any, from Moscow. A third option would be to refuse all Georgian requests for any military assistance. To do nothing would probably result in Georgia again depending upon the Russian military, and the West losing this historic opportunity to expand democracy in the Transcaucasus.

It is the second option, a *limited approach*, which best meets the stated objectives in the NSS of promoting democracy, as well as the NMS aims of peacetime engagement. The U.S. Army has methods for deploying military forces for operations other than war (OOTW) to include humanitarian assistance.⁴⁸

Summary

Security itself has become a much broader term. According to the NMS, one of the greatest challenges facing world security today is turning the armed forces of the former Soviet Union into a professional military institution under democratic civilian control. This includes former Soviet republics like Georgia.

The people interviewed for this research have indicated that most Georgians want a democracy, but that U.S. support causes problems with Russia. They reasoned that the NGSPP is an effective element that the U.S. military can use to assist Georgia in building a democracy.

Analysis of the data determined that a *limited approach* would best accomplish the NSS objectives in Georgia. The U.S. should pay attention to the Transcaucasus and assist Georgia in establishing a democracy. This is relevant to U.S. interests. It is also possible to pinpoint non-threatening military ways and means where they can provide influence. The U.S. military must carefully find the right tools and use them at the right time. While considering the appropriate ways and means, the U.S. must also keep in mind that the Georgian hope for democracy may not survive many more Russian winters.

When thinking about the use of the NGSPP in today's world, a prophetic story by former U.S. President John F. Kennedy comes to mind. He said:

. . . we must think and act not only for the moment . . . I am reminded of the story of the great French Marshal Lyautey, who once asked his gardener to plant a tree. The gardener objected that the tree was slow-growing and would not reach maturity for a hundred years. The Marshal replied, 'In that case, there is no time to lose, plant it this afternoon.'

The evidence found in this study validates that the NGSPP is unique in its structure and capabilities to provide assistance through military means, while at the same time creating a lesser perceived threat to other nations. The conclusions of this study support and advocate expanded use of the NGSPP.

ENDNOTES

- ¹A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 11-34.
- ²Arthur F. Lykee, Jr., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), <u>Military Strategy: Theory and Application</u> (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 1-8.
- ³Richard A. Chilcoat, Major General, U.S. Army, <u>Strategic</u>
 <u>Art: The New Discipline for the 21st Century Leaders</u> (Carlisle,
 PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), iii.
- ⁴Niccolo Machiavelli, <u>The Art of War</u>, trans. Ellis Farneworth (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), xxvii.
- ⁵Niccolo Machiavelli, <u>The Prince</u>, trans. Allan H. Gilbert (New York: Hendricks House, 1964), 12.
 - ⁶Ibid., 148-150.
 - ⁷Ibid., 170-171.
- ⁸Carl von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 81.
- ⁹Sun Tzu, <u>The Art of War</u>, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77-79.
- ¹⁰Samuel B. Griffith, preface to <u>The Art of War</u>, by Sun Tzu (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), x.
- ¹¹Stephen Metz, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Orthodoxy and Beyond," in <u>World View: The 1997 Strategic</u> <u>Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute</u>, ed. Earl H. Tilford, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 27.
- ¹²Charles G. Boyd, General, U.S. Army (Retired), "Promoting Democratic Partnerships With Former Adversaries" (Remarks delivered at the Convocation Ceremony of the first class of the College for Strategic Studies and Defense Economics, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-

Partenkirchen, Germany, 8 August 1994), <u>Speech File Service</u>, no. 1 (Fiscal Year 1995), 13-15.

¹³William J. Perry, "Fulfilling the Role of Preventive Defense" (Prepared Remarks for Address to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 13 May 1996), <u>Speech File Service</u>, 1A (Fiscal Year 1997), 2.

¹⁴Ibid., 6.

¹⁵Ibid., 2.

¹⁶Norman D. Levin, <u>Prisms & Policy: U.S. Security Strategy</u> <u>After the Cold War</u> (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 59.

¹⁷Graham E. Fuller, <u>The Democracy Trap: The Perils of the Post-Cold War</u> (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 243.

¹⁸National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 18.

¹⁹John M. Shalikashvili, General, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, preface to <u>National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement</u>, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

²⁰Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Remarks delivered to the U.S. Army War College, 18 July 1994), Speech File Service, no. 1 (Fiscal Year 1995), 3.

²¹Steven Kull, "The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review, no. 1 (January 1997), 10.

²²William E. Odom, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Retired), America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War (Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1993), 8.

²³NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 265.

²⁴Maria L. Britt, Major, Georgia Army National Guard, "The National Guard State Partnership Program: Democracy by Example," (Masters Thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1995), 66-83.

²⁵Ibid., 85.

²⁶David E. Mark, "Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus," <u>Foreign Policy</u>, no. 5 (Winter 1996-97), 145.

²⁷Robert V. Barylski, "Russia, The West, and The Caspian Energy Hub," <u>Middle East Journal</u> 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 217.

²⁸Ibid., 232.

²⁹Stephen Blank, "Russia's Real Drive to the South," <u>Orbis</u> 39, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 369-386.

30Mark, 144-145.

³¹Vakhtang Maisaia, "Russia is Displeased with Cooperation of Georgia with the NATO," <u>The Georgian Times</u>, no. 41 (23 October 1996), 4.

³²Stephen Blank, "Russia and Europe in the Caucasus," <u>European Security</u> 4, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 622-645.

³³Central Intelligence Agency, "Georgia" (1995); available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/gg.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 1996.

³⁴Irakli Tsereteli, "Seeking Stability Under Shevardnaze," Transition, (26 July 1996), 45.

³⁵Shireen T. Hunter, <u>The Transcaucasus in Transition:</u> <u>Nation-Building and Conflict</u> (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 110-141.

³⁶Malkaz Gulahvili, Owner and Publisher, <u>The Georgian Times</u>, interview by author, 27 February 1997, Parliament Building, Tbilisi, trans. Maia Namoradze, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.

- ³⁷James A. Bruno, Colonel, Georgia Army National Guard, Memorandum for the Adjutant General, Subject: State Partnership Program Information Paper (Atlanta, GA: Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Military Support, Georgia Army National Guard, 30 October 1996), 1-6; Charles J. Nutter, Lieutenant Colonel, Georgia Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, 23 January 1997.
- Randy T. Postell, Major, Georgia Army National Guard Memorandum for the Commander, 265th Engineer Group, Subject: Trip Report, Initial Planning Conference (IPC), Cornerstone 97, Tbilisi, Georgia (Marietta, GA: Headquarters, 265th Engineer Group, Georgia Army National Guard, 30 January 1997), 1-4 and Enclosures (8).
- ³⁹William H. Courtney, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia, interview by author, 25 February 1997, U.S. Embassy, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴⁰Lawrence M. Kerr, U.S. Deputy Chief of Missions to Georgia, interview by author, 25 February 1997, U.S. Embassy, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴¹James R. Howcroft, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Defense Attaché to Georgia, interview by author, 25 February 1997, U.S. Embassy, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴²Jemal Chumburidze, Major General, Georgian Army, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Georgian National Guard, interview by author, 26 February 1997, Headquarters, Georgian National Guard, Tbilisi, trans. Maia Namoradze, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴³Vakhtang Maisaia, Advanced Specialist for the Parliament Staff of Georgia, interview by author, 27 February 1997, Parliament Building, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴⁴Badri Kuchuradze, Head of Service for Public Opinion and International Affairs, interview by author, 27 February 1997, Parliament Building, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.

- ⁴⁵Gulahvili, 1997.
- ⁴⁶Revaz Adamia, Member of Georgian Parliament, interview by author, 27 February 1997, Parliament Building, Tbilisi, audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- ⁴⁷Glenda Nogami, "Introduction to Research Methods" (Lecture on 4 October 1996, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA).
- ⁴⁸Department of the Army, <u>Operations</u>, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 13.0-8.
- ⁴⁹Don M. Snider, <u>The National Security Strategy:</u>
 <u>Documenting Strategic Vision</u>, 2d ed. Strategic Studies Institute
 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), 13.
- ⁵⁰National Guard Almanac, eds., Ronald S. Hunter, et al., (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, 1996), 3.
- ⁵¹John F. Kennedy, Address at The University of California, Berkeley, California, 23 March 1962, quoted in <u>John F.Kennedy:</u> <u>In His Own Words</u>, eds. Maureen Harrison and Steve Gilbert, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1993), 172.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamia, Revaz, member of Georgian Parliament. Interview by author, 27 February 1997, Tbilisi. Audio tape recording. U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- Barylski, Robert V. "Russia, The West, and The Caspian Energy Hub." Middle East Journal 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 217-232.
- Blank, Stephen. "Russia and Europe in the Caucasus." <u>European</u>
 <u>Security</u> 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 622-645.
- _____. "Russia's Real Drive to the South." <u>Orbis</u> 39, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 369-386.
- Boyd, Charles G. "Promoting Democratic Partnerships With Former Adversaries." Remarks at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8 August 1994, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. <u>Speech File Service</u> 1 (Fiscal Year 1995): 13-15.
- Britt, Maria L. "The National Guard State Partnership Program: Democracy by Example." Masters Thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1995.
- Bruno, James A. <u>Memorandum for the Adjutant General</u>, <u>Subject</u>:

 <u>State Partnership Program Information Paper</u>. Atlanta, GA:

 Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Military

 Support, Georgia Army National Guard, 30 October 1996.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Georgia." 1995. Available from http:www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/gg.html; Internet: Accessed 17 December 1996.
- Chilcoat, Richard A. <u>Strategic Art: The New Discipline for the 21st Century Leaders</u>. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- Chumburidze, Jemal, Georgian Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Georgian National Guard. Interview by author, 26 February 1997, Tbilisi. Translated by Maia Namoradze. Audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.

- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Courtney, William H., U.S. Ambassador to Georgia. Interview by author, 25 February 1997. Audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- Fuller, Graham E. <u>The Democracy Trap: The Perils of the Post-Cold</u>
 War. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Gulahvili, Maldaz, owner and publisher of <u>The Georgian Times</u>.

 Interview by author, 27 February 1997, Tbilisi. Translated by Maia Namoradze. Audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- Howcroft, James R., U.S. Defense Attaché to Georgia. Interview by author, 25 February 1997, Tbilisi. Audio tape recording, U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- Hunter, Ronald S., Gary L. Smith, and Debra M. Gordon, eds.

 <u>National Guard Almanac</u>. Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services
 Almanac, 1996.
- Hunter, Shireen T. <u>The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict</u>. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.
- Kerr, Lawrence M., U.S. Deputy Chief of Missions to Georgia.
 Interview by author, 25 February 1997, Tbilisi. U.S. Army
 War College Library, Carlisle, PA.
- Kuchuradze, Badri, Head of Service for Public Opinion and International Affairs, Georgian Parliament. Interview by author, 27 February 1997, Tbilisi. U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, PA.

- Lee, Deborah R. (Remarks delivered to the U.S. Army War College, 18 July 1994). <u>Speech File Service</u> 1 (Fiscal Year 1995), 3-6.
- Levin, Norman D. <u>Prisms & Policy: U.S. Security Strategy After</u>
 the Cold War. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994.
- Lykee, Arthur F., Jr. <u>Military Strategy: Theory and Application</u>. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. <u>The Art of War</u>. Translated by Ellis Farneworth. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965.
- . The Prince. Translated by Allan H. Gilbert. New York: Hendricks House, 1964.
- Maisaia, Vakhtang. "Russia is Displeased with Cooperation of Georgia with the NATO." <u>The Georgian Times</u>, 41 (23 October 1996), 4.
- _____. Interview by author, 27 February 1997, Tbilisi. Audio tape recording. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- Mark, David E. "Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus." Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1996-97): 141-159.
- Metz, Stephen. "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Orthodoxy and Beyond." In World View: The 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, ed. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., 23-27. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997.
- Nagomi, Glenda. "Introduction to Research Methods." Lecture on 4 October 1996, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <u>NATO Handbook</u>. Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1995
- Nutter, Charles J., Georgia Army National Guard. Telephone interview by author, 23 January 1997, Atlanta, GA.
- Odom, William E. <u>America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War</u>. Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1993.

- Perry, William J.. "Fulfilling the Role of Preventive Defense" (Prepared remarks for address to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 3 May 1996), Speech File Service 1A (Fiscal Year 1997): 1-7.
- Postell, Randy T. Memorandum for the Commander, 265th Engineer Group, Subject: Trip Report, Initial Planning Conference (IPC), Cornerstone 97, Tbilisi, Georgia. Marietta, GA: Headquarters, 265th Engineer Group, Georgia Army National Guard, 30 January 1997.
- National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995:

 A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. With a preface by John M. Shalikashvili. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
- Snider, Don M. <u>The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision</u>, 2d ed. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated and with a preface by Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.
- Tsereteli, Irakli. "Seeking Stability Under Shevardnaze."

 Transition (26 July 1996): 42-45.
- The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>Operations</u>. Field Manual 100-5 Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993.